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ABSTRACT
Much of the promise of the good governance agenda in African countries
since the 1990s rested on reforms aimed at ‘getting the institutions right’,
sometimes by creating regulatory agencies that would be above the fray of
partisan politics. Such ‘institutional ﬁx’ strategies are often frustrated because
the new institutions themselves are embedded in existing state structures and
power relations. The article argues that implementing Kenya’s land law
reforms in the 2012–2016 period illustrates this dynamic. In Kenya, demo-
cratic structures and the 2010 constitutional devolution of power to county
governments created a complex institutional playing ﬁeld, the contours of
which shaped the course of reform. Diverse actors in both administrative and
representative institutions of the state, at both the national and county levels,
were empowered as ‘veto players’ whose consent and cooperation was
required to realize the reform mandate. An analysis of land administration
reform in eight Kenyan counties shows how veto players were able to slow or
curtail the implementation of the new land laws. Theories of African politics
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that focus on informal power networks and state incapacity may miss the
extent to which formal state structures and the actors empowered within
them can shape the course of reform, either by thwarting the reformist thrust
of new laws or by trying to harness their reformist potential.
MUCH OF THE PROMISE AND POTENTIAL of the international good govern-
ance agenda in Africa and throughout the late-developing world since the
1990s has rested on rule of law reforms aimed at ‘getting the institutions
right’. Faith in the power of multiparty elections was thus partially oﬀset by
faith in institutions that could remove important state functions from the
domain of electoral politics through legal reform or the setting up of inde-
pendent regulatory commissions.1 These ‘above politics’ reforms aimed at
enhancing the powers of neutral bureaucracies, technocracies, and judiciaries
that could restrain rulers, be they democratically elected or not. Such reform
agendas attracted the ﬁre of critics who see ‘institutional ﬁx’ strategies as
inherently limited. As critical legal theorists such as David Kennedy2 and law
and global governance scholars Navroz Dubash and Bronwen Morgan3 point
out, the creation of new institutions is itself a political process that takes place
on the uneven playing ﬁeld of existing state structure, and in any given set-
ting, this same context will go far in shaping the practical meanings, uses,
and eﬀectiveness of new regulatory structures and laws.4 This article argues
that the fraught history of Kenya’s land law reform from the adoption of the
National Land Policy in 2009 to the end of 2016 provides clear evidence in
support of this critique of ‘institutional ﬁxes’, and of the power of an
institutions-in-context explanation. We focus on the creation and working of
the non-partisan National Land Commission from 2012 to 2016.
1. On formally-independent regulatory agencies as an instrument in the good governance
strategies that were promoted by international agencies in the 1990s, see Manuel Teodoro
and Anne Pitcher, ‘Contingent technocracy: Bureaucratic independence in developing coun-
tries’, Journal of Public Policy 37, 4 (2017), pp. 401–429.
2. David Kennedy, ‘The “Rule of Law,” political choices, and development’, in David M.
Trubeck and Alvaro Santos (eds), The new law and economic development (Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge and New York, 2006), p. 106; Teodoro and Pitcher,
‘Contingent Technocracy’, p. 106.
3. Navroz Dubash and Bronwen Morgan (eds), The rise of the regulatory state in the Global
South (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012), pp. 185–197; and Teodoro and Pitcher,
‘Contingent bureaucracy’.
4. On the emphasis on creating institutions that would be autonomous from politics, see
also David M. Trubeck and Alvaro Santos, ‘Introduction: The Third Moment in law and
development theory and the emergence of a new critical practice’, in David M. Trubeck and
Alvardo Santos (eds), The new law and economic development (Cambridge University Press,
New York, 2006), pp. 1–18; Andrzej Rapaczynski, ‘The roles of the state and the market in
establishing property rights’, Journal of Economic Perspectives 10, 2 (2009), pp. 87–103;
Kanishka Jayasuria, ‘Regulatory state with dirigiste characteristics: Variegated pathways of
regulatory governance’, in Navroz Dubash and Bronwen Morgan (eds), The rise of the regula-
tory state in the Global South (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012), pp. 185–197; and
Teodoro and Pitcher, ‘Contingent bureaucracy’.
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Responding to long-standing popular demands for reforms in land law
and administration was a priority of the ﬁrst government that came to
power through electoral turnover in Kenya’s multiparty era. In 2002, new-
ly elected President Mwai Kibaki opened the door to a national debate
around land policy. This culminated in a new National Land Policy in
2009, a new constitution in 2010 that contained important progressive
land clauses, and the Land Acts of 2012 that were supposed to bring the
constitution’s land provisions to life. The centrepiece of these reforms was
a National Land Commission (NLC) which was to act as an independent
regulatory agency that would stand ‘above partisan politics’ and be
autonomous from the executive and the established political elite. Most
importantly, the NLC was to be a counterweight to the Ministry of
Lands, which was identiﬁed by national commissions and civil society as
the institutional epicentre of executive abuse-of-prerogative and land cor-
ruption. The NLC was to drive a process of land administration reforms
that would redress historical land grievances, rid the land sector of corrup-
tion, and restrain the elite’s voracious appetite for land and their ability to
manipulate land law to their own advantage. Yet as of mid-2016, there
was extensive evidence of widespread frustration arising from the blockage
and even subversion of these institutional reforms.5 By early 2016, the
NLC had been reined in by a Supreme Court advisory opinion. At the
end of the year, the Land Law Amendment Act of 2016 disbanded local
instances of the NLC and the County Land Management Boards
(CLMBs), and further curtailed the powers of the NLC itself.
Although it will take a generation or more to assess the full impact of
the 2012 land laws and of the National Land Commission, frustrations
and limitations of the 2009–2016 reform process have attracted great
attention inside Kenya and beyond. Most observers have traced the
blockages and reversals to chronic ills of Kenyan politics, including cor-
ruption, adverse incentives created by hyper-competitive party politics,
and ﬂaws in the quality and consistency of legal process and texts.6 These
critiques resonate with Africa-centred theories of neopatrimonialism or
elite settlements that show how legal and institutional reform can be fru-
strated by patronage politics and clientelism, corruption, low institutional
capacity, vested interests, inter-elite collusion, and the workings of informal
5. See Ambreena Manji, ‘Whose land is it anyway?’ (Africa Resource Institute, London,
2015); Ellen M. Bassett and Narae Choi, ‘Legal and institutional mapping for public land
management in Kenya: Since the 2010 constitution and devolution’ (A paper prepared for
the 2016 World Bank Land Conference, Washington, D.C., 2016); Ellen M. Basset, ‘The
challenge of reforming land governance in Kenya under the 2010 Constitution’, Journal of
Modern African Studies 55, 4 (2017), pp. 537–566; Jacqueline M. Klopp and Odenda
Lumumba, ‘Reform and counter-reform in Kenya’s land governance’, Review of African
Political Economy 44, 154 (2017), pp. 577–594.
6. Ibid.
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institutions. Our analysis acknowledges these forces, but seeks to take fuller
account of the existing structure of formal institutions in Kenya, including
representative institutions, and of deep-rooted political tensions in Kenyan
society around the purposes of reform. We follow political scientist George
Tsebelis in placing the spotlight on the diversity and multiplicity of ‘veto
players’ in the administrative and representative institutions of the Kenyan
government who had the power to stall, check, or undercut reform, and in
some instances, to use veto action to block attempts at elite capture.7 As
Tsebelis argued, and as Michael Albertus has shown recently with respect
to redistributive land reforms, legislating complex legal reform in formally
democratic settings with large numbers of institutional veto players is
extremely diﬃcult. The veto-player approach focuses on the formal institu-
tional playing ﬁeld (rather than its weaknesses) and highlights ways in
which it empowers political and administrative actors to shape or stall the
course of reform.
This article argues that eﬀectiveness of the NLC and its county-level
emanations, the CLMBs, was curbed by veto players who pushed back
against either the constitutional vision of the NLC and CLMBs, or by
partisan capture of the CLMBs at the local level. Potential veto players
were positioned at every level of the political system from the national
executive branch to the National Assembly to the new county governors
and county assemblies created by the 2010 constitution and devolution.
The case thus suggests that the limits of the reform vision lay in part in
the hope that an independent regulatory commission, created through the
domestic political process, would nonetheless be ‘above politics’ and thus
able to somehow circumvent the multiple and myriad interests of political
actors who, thanks to positions in administrative and representative insti-
tutions that were adjacent to or interlocking with the NLC, were in a pos-
ition to block or veto realization of critical parts of the NLC’s original
mandate.
The ﬁrst part of the article is a brief review of the circumstances that
propelled land law reform eﬀorts in Kenya in the 2000s. Broad-based
7. See George Tsebelis, ‘Decision making in political systems: Veto players in presidential-
ism, parliamentarism, multicameralism, and multipartyism’, British Journal of Political
Science, 25, 3 (1995), pp. 289–325; George Tsebelis, Veto players: How political institutions
work (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2002). Tsebelis argued that the more
numerous the veto players in any given process of attempted reform, the lower the chances
of institutional or policy reform. On land reform, see Michael Albertus, Autocracy and redistri-
bution: The politics of land reform (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2015). On institu-
tional change, see also James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen, ‘A Theory of Gradual
Institutional Change’, in James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen (eds), Explaining institutional
change: Ambiguity, agency, and power (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009), pp.
1–37. For an application of the veto player concept in African politics, see Nic Cheeseman
and Miles Tendi, ‘The internal dynamics of power-sharing in Africa’, Democratization 18, 2
(2011), pp. 336–65.
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mobilization of civil society around this objective makes this an especially
interesting case for studying a ‘rule of law’ reform: the kind of popular
support and high visibility that can contribute to the success of such
reform initiatives were present in this case, at least in pre-legislative stages
of the process. The second section brieﬂy describes the drafting and pas-
sing of Kenya’s 2012 land laws, highlighting executive branch advantage
at this stage of the reform process. The third section recaps the main
2012–2016 strategies of executive branch claw-back of powers that, by the
constitutional mandate and the 2012 Land Acts, were supposed to go the
NLC.8
The fourth and longest section presents the bulk of the article’s original
empirical contribution. It identiﬁes and analyses veto-player action to
check the powers of the NLC or delay set-up of the CLMBs in eight of
the 47 Kenyan countries from 2013 to 2016. The analysis is based upon
ﬁeldwork undertaken in 2016 that relied upon county-level interviews
with key informants (mostly county-level administrative and political
actors), as well as news reports and grey literature, to gather information
on the institutional presence and functioning of the NLC and the CLMBs
at the county-level.9 Kenyan counties were selected purposively in an
eﬀort to capture some of the main lines of variation in partisan dynamics
in 2013–2016 and in land politics that were expected (hypothesized) to be
salient in shaping county-level politics around the NLC and the CLMBs.
Based on existing research on the intersection of partisan and land politics
in Kenya, we expected counties that voted for the opposition party candi-
dates in the 2013 presidential elections to be most eager to embrace the
NLC reform agenda, and thus likely to extend the cooperation and con-
sent needed for NLC eﬀectiveness. Conversely, we expected the NLC to
encounter veto players in counties that voted for the winning Jubilee alli-
ance in the 2013 general elections, and in counties with high levels of rur-
al land-related conﬂict. The counties included in the analysis are Kiambu,
8. For more detailed accounts see Manji, Whose land is it anyway? and Bassett, ‘The chal-
lenge of reforming land governance in Kenya’.
9. The research team included one MPhil Research Associate of the British Institute in
Eastern Africa (BIEA) and four Kenyan post-graduate students whose degrees related to
land use politics in the county-types targeted for analysis. Our structured, focused compari-
son of the status and workings of CLMBs in countries selected according to principles out-
lined above involved interviews with academics, national-level land sector actors and NGOs;
secondary and gray literature reviews; and approximately three to four weeks of ﬁeldwork in
each county, focusing on interviews with county government oﬃcials, County Land
Management Board members, local real estate agents and land advocacy NGOs. The gener-
alizability of our ﬁndings is subject to limitations of geographic scope (including omission of
Coastal counties), method (purposive county sampling, small number of cases in a case-
based, observational study), and data sources and availability (we observed events as they
were unfolding, relying on documentary sources in the public domain and purposively-
selected interviews with individuals in political and administrative oﬃce). The total number
of people interviewed at the county level is approximately 60.
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Bomet, Meru, Nakuru, Narok, Isiolo, Machakos, Siaya. They range from
clear and steadfast supporters of the Jubilee coalition, to split counties
and post-election coalition defectors, to opposition counties,10 some of
which had highly visible and long politicized land conﬂicts (Nakuru,
Narok), while land conﬂicts in others were less partisan and/or more loca-
lized (Kiambu, Bomet, Meru, Isiolo, Machakos, Siaya).11
Our ﬁndings from the eight counties reveal a greater diversity of potentially
salient administrative and elected veto players, and more politically-salient
land issue dimensions, than was captured in our case selection criteria and
starting hypotheses. This is partly due to the devolution ushered in by the
2010 Constitution, which spurred political and partisan competition and elite
turn-over at the county level.12 It is also partly due to post-election regional
tensions that strained the Jubilee coalition. Given this complexity, the
county-level cases provide strong support for a veto-players focused explan-
ation of obstacles to realization of the NLC’s original mandate. Diﬀerentially
motivated actors within formal administrative and representative institutions
at both the national and the county level were able to stymie action by with-
holding cooperation or consent. To highlight the veto mechanism and its
eﬀects, the county case studies are clustered under three subheadings that
highlight the institutional locus of the veto player action that appeared to be
most decisive in blocking the set-up of CLMBs: the county executive, the
county legislature, or the national-level administration or ruling party. In
10. Machakos and Siaya counties voted for opposition leader Raila Odinga in 2013; Bomet
and Meru were Jubilee Alliance members but fell-out with Jubilee in 2015; Nakuru and
Kiambu counties voted largely for the victorious Jubilee Alliance in 2013 and stuck with it
through 2016; Narok was hotly contested between Jubilee and the opposition in the 2013
general election. Isiolo voted Jubilee in 2013 but was split. On regionalism and land politics
in Kenya, see notes below.
11. In terms of land tenure and land issues, the study counties also represent a spectrum:
Meru, Kiambu, and Machakos have much adjudicated and titled land and low levels of land-
related conﬂict; Siaya’s land is mostly adjudicated but most landholders await transactable
titles, in a setting with low levels of politicized land conﬂict; land politics in Narok is trad-
itionally dominated by bitter and locally-divisive group-ranch and native/settler issues; Isiolo
is mostly Trust Land with predominantly pastoral land use; and in Narok and Nakuru,
settlement schemes are the focus of high-visibility, divisive land issues. An important limita-
tion of the study is that our cases do not include a county from Kenya’s Coast. On the
Coast, see Karuti Kanyinga, ‘Politics and struggles for access to land: “Grants from above"
and “squatters” in Coastal Kenya’, European Journal of Development Research 10, 2 1998, pp.
50–69; Kathleen Klaus, ‘Contentious land narratives and non-escalation of election violence:
Evidence from Kenya’s Coast Region’, African Studies Review 60, 2 (2017), pp. 51–72.
12. See Karuti Kanyinga, ‘Devolution and the new politics of development in Kenya’,
African Studies Review 59, 3 (2016), pp. 155–167; Nic Cheeseman, Gabrielle Lynch, and
Justin Willis, ‘Decentralization in Kenya: The governance of the governors’, Journal of
Modern African Studies 54, 1 (2016), pp. 1–35; Agnes Cornell and Michelle D’Arcy, ‘Plus ça
change? County-level politics in Kenya after devolution’, Journal of Eastern African Studies 8,
1 (2014), pp. 173–91; Michelle D’Arcy and Agnes Cornell, ‘Devolution and corruption in
Kenya: Everyone’s turn to eat?’ African Aﬀairs 115, 459 (2016), pp. 246–273; Alex
Dyzenhaus, ‘Land, local government, and minority representation: The experience of decen-
tralisation in Kenya’ (University of Oxford, unpublished MPhil thesis, 2015).
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concluding, the article discusses the scope and limits of ‘the institutional ﬁx’
in the case of Kenyan land law reform and of the NLC in particular, as well
as possibilities opened by veto-player analysis of legislative and policy reforms
in African countries.
Land law reform in Kenya: from civil society demands to legislative provision of
law
Land issues have been a dominant theme in Kenyan politics for the last
century.13 Today Kenya is one of the most unequal countries in Africa,
with one of the highest Gini coeﬃcients for land inequality on the contin-
ent.14 This state of aﬀairs is widely understood by political analysts and
ordinary Kenyans alike to be the result, at least in part, of the on-going
ability of powerful individuals and groups to use state power to allocate
land to themselves and to politically favoured groups. Historical land
injustices, land grievances, and land revendications have fuelled political
mobilizations and violent conﬂict at key junctures in Kenyan politics since
the early twentieth century.15
These long-standing tensions and conﬂicts, culminating in land-related
electoral violence around the 1992, 1997, and 2007 elections, all contrib-
uted to very high levels of pressure for land law reform in Kenya.16 A ser-
ies of presidential commission reports and oﬃcial policy review processes
clearly pointed to a chronic pattern of land abuses by the executive
13. See for example Kanyinga, ‘Politics and struggles for access to land’; Kanyinga,
‘Devolution and the new politics of development’; Jacqueline M. Klopp, ‘Pilfering the public:
The problem of land grabbing in contemporary Kenya’, Africa Today 47, 1 (2000), pp. 7–26;
J. O. Oucho, Undercurrents of ethnic conﬂict in Kenya (Brill Publishers, Leiden, 2002); David
Anderson and Emma Lochery, ‘Violence and exodus in Kenya’s Rift Valley: Predictable and
preventable?’, Journal of Eastern African Studies 2, 2 (2008), pp. 328–343; John Harbeson,
‘Land and the quest for a democratic state in Kenya: Bringing citizens back in’, African
Studies Review 55,1 (2012), pp. 15–30; Catherine Boone, ‘Politically-allocated land rights
and the geography of electoral violence in Kenya’, Comparative Political Studies 44, 10
(2011), pp. 1311–1342; Catherine Boone, ‘Land conﬂict and distributive politics in Kenya’,
African Studies Review 55, 1 (2012), pp. 75–103; Catherine Boone, Property and political order
in Africa: Land rights and the structure of politics (Cambridge University Press, New York and
Cambridge, 2014).
14. World Bank, ‘Kenya poverty and inequality assessment Vol. 1: Synthesis report’
(World Bank Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit Africa Region, Report
No. 44190-KE, World Bank, Washington, DC, April 2009). The Gini coeﬃcient measures
inequality or concentration in a distribution, ranging from 0 to 1, where 0 corresponds to
perfect equality and 1 to perfect inequality. Kenya’s land Gini was over .6 in 1997 (ibid).
15. See note 11.
16. See Anderson and Lochery, ‘Violence and exodus’, Susanne Mueller, ‘The political
economy of Kenya’s crisis’, Journal of East African Studies 2, 2 (2008), pp. 185–201; Mwangi
Kagwanja, Killing the vote: State sponsored violence and ﬂawed elections in Kenya (Kenya
Human Rights Commission, Nairobi, 1998); Tom Wolf, ‘“Poll poison”? Politicians and poll-
ing in the 2007 Kenya election’, Journal of Contemporary African Studies 27, 3 (2009), pp.
279–304.
221LAND LAW REFORM IN KENYA D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/afraf/article-abstract/118/471/215/5380591 by London School of Econom
ics user on 05 N
ovem
ber 2019
branch, and by the Ministry of Lands in particular.17 During the post-
electoral violence in 2008, more than 1000 people were killed and over
300,000 displaced in violence that was partly land-related. This brought
Kenya to its lowest point since independence, disgracing the ruling elite
and adding impetus to long-standing calls for political reform. One result
was approval of a new National Land Policy in 2009, after more than a
decade of civil society activism on the land issue. The main lines of the
NLP were incorporated into the 2010 constitution. Kenya’s 2012 land
laws provided the enabling legislation to put the new principles and proce-
dures into practice.
One of the targets of the new constitution, and to a lesser extent the
2012 land laws, was to deal with the politicized and corrupt ‘den of
thieves’ that was the old Ministry of Lands. Although the new land laws in
2012 did less to achieve a radical overhaul of the Ministry of Lands than
many had hoped (see below), some important changes were made. The
Ministry was divested of some of its key land powers such as sole control
over the registries, control over the allocation and management of public
land, control over resettlement, and powers to revoke title deeds that were
found to have been acquired illegally.18 Many important powers of the
Ministry were transferred to the NLC or to be shared with the NLC by
the National Land Commission Act 2012. The NLC was to establish its
presence on the ground through the CLMBs established in each county.
Seven to nine members of each CLMB were to be appointed by the NLC,
but were subject to approval by the new County Assemblies and the
county governors. Governors were to appoint one CLMB member.
Deconcentration thus intersected with devolution, giving both county
executives and county legislatures a say in CLMB composition.19
17. These reports and policy review processes included the Report of the Commission of
Inquiry into the Land Law Systems of Kenya of 2002 (the Njonjo Commission Report), the
Commission of Inquiry into Illegal/ Irregular Allocation of Land 2004 (the Ndung’u
Commission Report), the Commission of Inquiry into Post- Election Violence following the
December 2007 General Election (the Waki Commission Report), and the National Land
Policy formulation process. The former constitution empowered the president to ‘make
grants or dispositions of any estates, interests, or rights’ over public land. As the Ndungu
Commission revealed, the president’s authority was perpetually abused. See for example
Harbeson, ‘Land and the quest for a democratic state’; Klopp, ‘Pilfering the public’;
Ambreena Manji, ‘The grabbed state: Lawyers, politics, and public land in Kenya’, Journal of
Modern African Studies 50, 3 (2012), pp. 467–492; Karuti Kanyinga, ‘The legacy of the white
highlands: Land rights, ethnicity and the post-2007 election violence in Kenya’, Journal of
Contemporary African Studies 27, 3 (2009), pp. 325–344.
18. It was renamed the Ministry of Land, Housing, and Urban Development, and later
renamed again, to become Ministry of Lands and Physical Planning (MoLPP). In this paper,
we will retain the acronym MoL.
19. Kenyans have debated whether the CLMB is a decentralized instance of a technocratic
arm of government, or a ‘democratically decentralized’ forum for making land management
more participatory.
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Potentially signiﬁcant powers were given to the new NLC. It was sup-
posed to manage and administer public land in the counties in collabor-
ation with county-level land use and physical planning committees. A key
responsibility was to recover public land that had been irregularly or
illegally allocated, a mandate that extended to the investigation of private
land that might have been acquired illegally.20 County governments were
also given unclearly deﬁned but potentially signiﬁcant powers to manage
land within their counties. Most notably, they were to manage ex-Trust
Land (unregistered rural land managed by the old county councils) dur-
ing the interregnum between passage of the 2012 land laws and the writ-
ing and passing of a new Community Land Bill, constitutionally
mandated to be completed by 2016.21 The net eﬀect was envisioned as a
far-reaching overhaul that would bring land administration under the rule
of law through the actions of the non-partisan and supposedly independ-
ent NLC, with some powers diﬀused through devolution to the new
county governments.
National Assembly: poor drafting by design?
Ambreena Manji argues that it was soon clear that the ambiguities and
limitations of the land laws would be obstacles to the kind of land reform
envisioned by the land activists and civil society groups who had pushed
for the 2009 National Land Policy and the 2010 constitution. The land
legislation’s drafting and path through Parliament in 2012 was a process
that was rushed, apparently disconnected at key points from the intent of
the land provisions of the 2010 constitution, and largely divorced from
meaningful citizen and civil society participation.22 This was starkly evi-
dent in the National Land Commission Bill, which was hastily drafted by
a consultant who was hired by the Ministry of Lands itself. Given the cen-
trality of the NLC to the success of the land law reform eﬀort, the Bill was
remarkably sketchy.23 Crucially, the Bill failed to clearly locate and delin-
eate the respective responsibilities of the NLC and the Ministry of Lands
20. According to the Ndungu Commission, nearly 200,000 illegal land titles were created
between 1962 and 2002, 96% of these in 1986–2002 (Manji, Whose land is it anyway?, p.
6). These titles are held by politicians, high ranking civil servants, members of the judiciary,
military oﬃcers, and lawyers, among others.
21. The Constitution and the 2012 land laws left open the question of the Land Control
Boards, which controlled land transactions on adjudicated family land in ’land control areas’
on Trust Lands (coinciding mostly with administrative divisions). The LCBs were part of
Kenya’s powerful Provincial Administration which answered directly to the President.
22. Ambreena Manji, ‘The politics of land reform in Kenya 2012’, African Studies Review
57, 1 (2014): 115–130; Manji, Whose land is it anyway?; Bassett, ‘The challenge of reform-
ing land governance in Kenya’.
23. Weaknesses were identiﬁed at the time by civil society groups including the Kenya
Land Non-State Actors Alliance, Kituo cha Sheria, and others.
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in the domain of land registration and titling, and it failed to delineate the
functions of the NLC’s county level emanations, the CLMBs.
Lack of clarity about the respective roles of the old Ministry of Lands
and the new NLC thus bound the NLC in ambiguous and overlapping
relationships with the national executive branch, county executives, and
county legislatures. Groups such as the Katiba Institute’s Consortium on
Land headed by the former Chairperson of the Constitution of Kenya
Review Commission, Professor Yash Pal Ghai, pointed out at the time
that the proposed bills would be very hard to implement.24 Indeed, the
laws were structured in ways that created opportunities for diverse actors
seeking to block, capture, or prevent elite capture of the new land institu-
tions to exert veto powers over strategic decision areas and processes.
Executive branch blockages and veto
Over the course of 2013–2016, the Ministry of Land resisted yielding its
powers and responsibilities and worked to retain the mandate of the NLC
within its control. The Ministry and the executive branch battled the NLC
in every conceivable way, including by starving it of funds, failing to turn
over relevant information, blatant obstructionism, and openly defying consti-
tutional and legal provisions that mandated a transfer of power to the
NLC.25 Critically, between 2013 and 2016, the NLC was not able to get
access to inventories of public land or land registries. This meant that it
could not identify titles or allotment letters issued for holdings on public
land and was thus unable to investigate the many past land allocations that
were suspected to have been illegal or irregular. It was also blocked from
regularizing the allocation and titling process on smallholdings, especially in
settlement schemes, even though taking up this responsibility was another
core objective of those who had backed land administration reform in Kenya
for many years. The NLC eventually took its case to the High Court, seeking
arbitration in its institutional battles with the Ministry of Land around
powers of land taxation; control of the land registries, registrars, and sur-
veyors; and control over land registration and the issuance of titles.26 In
24. See the Katiba Consortium on Land, ‘The Land Bills, 2012: Areas for review: a docu-
ment presented to the Drafting Committee on the Land Bills, 21 March 2012’ (posted at
Katiba Institute, Nairobi, Kenya) <www.katibainstitute.org> (29 June 2017); Manji, Whose
land is it anyway?; Teodoro and Pitcher, ‘Contingent technocracy’, p. 10, write that poorly-
drafted legislation is an early signal of lack of credible commitment.
25. Ibid; Klopp and Lumumba, ‘The state of Kenya’s land policy and land reform’.
26. The High Court of Kenya Constitutional and Human Rights Division ruled on the
relationship between these bodies in a case concerning the validity and constitutionality of
titles deeds and lease documents issued by the Land Ministry. See the Kenya Supreme
Count advisory opinion of 2 December 2015: ‘In the matter of the National Land
Commission [2015] eKLR; Advisory Opinion Reference No 2 of 2014’ (Kenya National
Council for Law Reporting, The Attorney-General’s Oﬃce, Nairobi) <http://kenyalaw.org/
caselaw/cases/view/116512> (2 January 2016).
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December 2015, the Court issued an Advisory Opinion that conﬁrmed the
Ministry in many of its powers, including land titling. It obliged the Ministry
to ‘share information’ with the NLC and called for the two institutions to
‘work together’.27
A Land Laws (Amendment) Bill drafted by the Ministry of Lands in
2015 proposed to re-centre control over land information systems in the
Ministry and to disband the CLMBs that the NLC had succeeded in set-
ting up in 44 of the 47 counties.28 It morphed into an Omnibus Bill that
was described by Muhammad Swazuri, Chairman of the NLC, in his tes-
timony to parliament on 23 June 2015, as ‘undermining devolution’ and
‘unconstitutional’.29 It appeared to many reformers as a complete claw-
back of land administration powers by the Ministry.30 It was passed by the
National Assembly and the Senate, and was signed by the president in
August 2016, two weeks before the constitutionally mandated deadline
for passage of this legislation.
Enactment and implementation of the 2012 land law reforms at the
county level appeared to many observers between 2013 and 2016 to be a
process that was slowed, and in many cases subverted, by poor planning,
weak institutional capacity, and corruption. A Ministry of Devolution
draft policy paper listed the main weaknesses facing devolution of land
administration as weak collaboration between stakeholders, weak moni-
toring and evaluation, insuﬃcient legal frameworks, inability to develop
quality legislation, the challenge of attracting and retaining staﬀ, absence
of information systems, inherited staﬀ from local authorities, unstructured
public participation, uncoordinated planning, duplication and conﬂict of
roles and functions, and tokenism in public participation.31 A close look
at county-level politics, however, supports the main argument of this art-
icle, which is that an interpretation focused on institutional structure and
on institutional and partisan veto players is also possible. The new land
institutions and their mandates were intertwined with representative and
administrative agencies at both the national and county levels. Several
types of political actors, most of whom were elected, occupied positions
within the state apparatus that enabled them to veto the set-up or the
eﬀective operations of the CLMBs. These political actors included the
27. Manji, Whose land is it anyway?
28. This included the Community Lands Bill. See Liz Alden Wiley, ‘The Community
Land Act: Now it’s up to communities’, The Star, 17 September 2016, <http://www.the-star.
co.ke/news/2016/09/17/the-community-land-act-now-its-up-to-communities_c1420295> (29
June 2017).
29. Ramadhan Rajab, ‘Proposed lands bill ‘will kill’ devolution’, The Star, 11 September 2015
<http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2015/09/11/proposed-land-bills-will-kill-devolution_c1203147>
(2 January 2016).
30. Ibid. See Klopp and Lumumba, ‘The state of Kenya’s land policy and land reform’.
31. Republic of Kenya, Ministry of Devolution and Planning, ‘Draft Devolution Policy’
(Nairobi, 2015), p. 28. <http://www.devolutionplanning.go.ke> (2 January 2016).
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county executive or governor, factions within the county legislatures or
assemblies, and political/ partisan elites at the national level.
County executives acted as veto players in Kiambu, Machakos, and Isiolo
In Kiambu, NLC chair M. Swazuri nominated CLMB members for local
vetting in 2014, but the Kiambu county executive branch refused to reveal
these names to the County Assembly members for vetting and a vote.
Kiambu’s governor was able to block the formation of the CLMB in the
face of the vigorous opposition of the majority of MCAs, who passed an
unsuccessful motion in December 2015 demanding that the Governor
release the names of the seven persons nominated to the Kiambu CLMB
so that the process could move forward. Between 2013 and 2016, the
county executive controlled land issues in Kiambu and was able to veto
the involvement of other actors. One MCA, Karungo Thang’wa from
Ngewa Ward, commented that ‘[w]hat we see is an ostensible move by
the County Government trying to grab land… the names have continued
to remain secret up to date’.32 Limuru Central MCA Njenga Murugami
seconded the motion to employ a legal mechanism to compel the county
government to make known the names, allow the vetting and voting, and
create the CLMB: ‘We need the board to check what has been happening
for the last three years in Kiambu County in regard to land matters and
also issue title deeds’.33 MCAs believed that the Kiambu county executive
branch oﬃcial refused to constitute the CLMB in order to assert unmedi-
ated control over the alienation and allocation of public land.
Public land was indeed the key land resource under government control
in this county (given that there is little Trust Land; most land is registered
and adjudicated). Kiambu county oﬃcials worked concertedly to identify
and assert control over public lands held under expired leases, by squat-
ters, under allotment letters, and held illegally.34 The county executive
argued that it held at least shared powers in the repossession and realloca-
tion of public land, as well as in regulating change-of-user on private
leasehold land, authorizing subdivision of leaseholds, and even the man-
agement of forest land and vacant public land. This set the stage for
32. Pharis Kinyua, ‘Kabongo [may be] compelled to release names of 7 Lands board mem-
bers’, Kiambu County News, 3 December 2015, <www.hivisasa.com/kiambu/news/99953> (3
April 2018).
33. Pharis Kinyua, ‘Kabongo [may be] compelled to release names of 7 Lands board mem-
bers’, Kiambu County News, 3 December 2015, <www.hivisasa.com/kiambu/news/99953> (3
April 2018).
34. Interviews with lands oﬃcers in Kiambu county executive, February and March 2016.
County executive discretion was enhanced by the fact that Land Control Board oﬃcers who
had information about parcels that may have been acquired irregularly or illegally remained
based in the Kiambu County Commissioner’s oﬃce (former DC oﬃce) and on the county
government pay-roll.
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stalemate with the NLC, which argued in defence of its mandate to
administer public lands and insisted that control over land under expired
leases reverts back to the central government.
Machakos County created a CLMB in 2014, but neutralized it entirely.
The CLMB was constituted mostly by members of the county land
administration bureaucracy who, like other land actors in local govern-
ment, were pre-devolution era hold-overs. The county level lands execu-
tive and CLMB thus ‘shared staﬀ’,35 allowing the same person to act on
behalf of both the county and the NLC. Furthermore, many former
Machakos county councillors remained in land oﬃces in the new county
government (as was the case in several of the other counties included in
this study).36 In Machakos as in other counties, such government employ-
ees were often associated with the privatization and sell-oﬀ of public land
in the transition period. After 2013, they were strategically positioned to
stall or obstruct inquiry into these activities.37
The legal mandate of the NLC made it a potential obstacle to the
advancement of the ambitious development plans of the Machakos gov-
ernor. As things turned out, however, the NLC did not play this role.
After the Jubilee Alliance’s national electoral victory in 2013, opposition-
aligned Machakos governor Alfred Mutua forged an alliance with his erst-
while partisan and Machakos rival, Charity Ngilu, who was appointed
Cabinet Secretary for Lands in 2013.38 Between 2013 and 2016, the
county government and the Ministry of Lands worked together on a series
of large-scale land initiatives, at the expense of the NLC. Members of the
Machakos County Assembly, 71 per cent of whom were elected on
Mutua’s party ticket, followed the Governor in the land politics domain:
they did not act as an independent force in county land politics.
Mutua’s political alliance with the Cabinet Secretary of the Ministry of
Lands, Ngilu, cleared the way for large-scale, smallholder land titling
initiatives in Machakos. Machakos was one of three counties (including
Meru and Kiliﬁ) targeted by the Ministry of Land for smallholder titling
in Spring 2016, part of the national government’s larger plan to issue 3
35. Interviews with Machakos county land oﬃcials.
36. Ibid.
37. Patrick Lang’at reported that ‘most of these assets were in the form of land [“owned by
the defunct county councils”] that had not been surveyed and had no titles’. 4,085 pieces of
land were at issue – they were to be audited and handed over to the Transition Authority,
but instead were ‘transferred to’ and ‘shared out among’ ‘unscrupulous individuals assisted
by errant former local authorities’ oﬃcials’ (Patrick Lang’at, ‘How counties lost Sh 143bn
property: Idle land and vehicles were shared out before the 2013 General Election’, The
Nation, 5 September 2016, <https://www.nation.co.ke/counties/Counties-lost-Sh143bn-
assets/1107872-3369884-15lfh63/index.html> (3 April 2018).
38. Ngilu was ousted from this post over corruption allegations in 2015.
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million title deeds before the 2017 elections.39 Issuing titles worked to
shore up the Machakos governor’s political base as well as support for the
Jubilee government, but the Ministry of Land’s authority to do so was vig-
orously (and ultimately, unsuccessfully) contested by the NLC. Mutua
also teamed up with the head of the Ministry to allocate large tracks of
land for development megaprojects. Over the objections of the Ministry of
Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries, Machakos county obtained 2,000
acres of public land for the Machakos City Project, aimed at attracting
investors to fully serviced industrial sites on tax-free land. In another
dust-up over public land, land for the Konza City megaproject (spanning
Machakos and Makueni counties) was purchased by the national govern-
ment from the oﬃcials of a Machakos land buying company who were
later sued by members for fraudulent dealing.40 The constitutional man-
date and the 2012 land laws surely envisioned the NLC and CLMB as
prominent actors in the negotiations over such land deals. However, the
NLC was checked in Machakos by national and county politicians who
established a tight and politically beneﬁcial alliance around the politics of
land allocation.
In Isiolo, the county executive captured and neutralized the CLMB. In
2014, the Isiolo governor and the County Assembly duly appointed a
CLMB dominated by members of the governor’s own sub-clan in the
Borana community. This group also controlled the County Assembly.41
The appointment was widely viewed as an example of excessive politiciza-
tion of a CLMB. Although two non-Borana were added later, the Isiolo
government showed no signs of willingness to constitute a CLMB that
was independent of the county executive. As one local interviewee
declared, ‘Borana have made it clear that Isiolo belongs to them’.42
Isiolo’s county government was strongly aligned to the national-level
ruling coalition, the Jubilee coalition. It campaigned on a unity agenda of
overcoming the long history of ethnic and political divisions in Isiolo,
bringing together the various ethnic communities with the goal of protect-
ing community land for pastoralists. In spite of the unity pledge, after
2013 long-dominant Borana elite actors tightened their grip on county
politics at the expense of other communities. This logic was visible in the
land domain. In 2015 and through April 2016, the CLMB conducted no
visible activity other than a few publicity workshops. The Isiolo county
39. Ngilu’s successor, Jacob Kimenyi, announced 86,000 title deeds for Yatta and Masinga
subcounties.
40. See ‘Row over land now threatens county’s big day’, Daily Nation, 5 November 2013,
<http://www.nation.co.ke/counties/Machakos-county-land-Felix-Koskei/-/1107872/2062134/-/
view/printVersion/-/g250mpz/-/index.html> (4 April 2018).
41. Interviews in Isiolo county, January 2016. The Kenyan government oﬃcially recognizes
six Isoilo Borana sub-clans.
42. Interview, community member, Isiolo, around 10 February 2016.
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government itself did not take a visible lead on any of the major land-
related issues facing the county in 2015 and 2016, including the drafting
of the Community Land Bill that would go far in determining the locus of
control over Isiolo’s rangelands and public lands for the next several gen-
erations. There was frustration among some civil society and political
society actors and suspicion that the county elite were positioning them-
selves as future leading beneﬁciaries of the ‘opening up’ of Isiolo through
the mega-development projects that were being planned by the central
government.43
County legislatures acted as Veto Players in Narok, Bomet, and Siaya
In Narok County, the setting-up of the CLMB was mired in disputes over
its membership and was ultimately blocked by veto-actions which
reﬂected deeper political divisions in the county. The County Assembly
rejected two out of the seven members nominated by the NLC in 2014.
Most of the nominees were from the majority Il Purko clan of the Maasai.
Members of minority clans, including the Governor’s Siria clan, which
controlled the County Assembly, objected that they were not represented.
Siria clan members ﬁled a court petition in 2015, challenging the process
of setting-up the board on the grounds that it lacked transparency and
was not substantially representative of the people of Narok.44 The result
was a stalemate; in 2016 Narok County had a CLMB secretary who was
appointed directly by the NLC in Nairobi and assisted by clerks in Narok,
but the CLMB had no members. It appeared that powerful interests
lodged in the county legislature sought either to ensure decisive inﬂuence
over the CLMB or to neutralize it completely.
The clan divide in Narok shaped land politics as well as competition for
control within the formal institutions of government. It pitted the Il
Purko, who long dominated politics in Narok through their powerful
43. Interviews in Isiolo, Feb. 2016. See Neil Carrier and Hassan H. Kochore, ‘Navigating
ethnicity and electoral politics in northern Kenya: The case of the 2013 election’, Journal of
Eastern African Studies 8, 1 (2014), pp. 135–52; Ben White, Saturnino M. Borras Jr., Ruth
Hall, Ian Scoones and Wendy Wolford, ‘The new enclosures: critical perspectives on corpor-
ate land deals’, The Journal of Peasant Studies 39, 3–4 (2012), pp. 619–647; Adrian J.
Browne, LAPSSET: The history and politics of an eastern African MegaProject (Rift Valley
Forum, London and Nairobi, 2015); Jon Abbink, Kelly Askew, Dereje Feyissa Dori et al.,
‘Lands of the future: transforming pastoral livelihoods in eastern Africa’ (Working Paper n.
154, Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Halle/Saale, Germany, 2014). On land
politics around the Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport (LAPSETT) project, see
also Hannah Elliott, ‘Planning, property, and plots at the gateway to Kenya’s “new frontier”’,
Journal of Eastern African Studies 10, 3 (2016), pp. 511–529.
44. Hansard Report, 9 April 2015 County Assembly Debate, ‘Vetting of nominees to the
Narok County Land Management Board’; Interview, Lands Oﬃcer, Nairobi, 26 June 2017.
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position within the long-ruling Kenya African National Union (KANU)
party, against several minority Maasai clans, including the Siria clan of the
newly elected Narok governor. The former county council, largely controlled
by Il Purko interests, had wide powers over Trust Land in the pre-
devolution period and was deeply implicated in the land administration mal-
practices and misdeeds that fuelled anger against the elite. Members of the Il
Purko clan were said to control as much as 85 per cent of the land in
Narok.45 Complicating matters were fractures that exist within clans and that
ﬁnd expression in struggles over and within group ranches.46 These local
issues shaped the evolution of the role of the NLC and the CLMB in Narok.
Narok’s governor, Samuel Ole Tunai, ran for oﬃce in 2013 on the tick-
et of Deputy President Ruto’s United Republican Party (URP) as an
underdog candidate from the minority Siria clan. He was able to take the
top position in county politics because the Il Purko vote was split between
two rivals, and because Tunai mobilized the support of the non-Maasai,
including URP-aligned Kipsigis (representing perhaps 16,000 URP votes)
residing in the 1990s settlement schemes in the Mau Forest, from which
Tunai himself was said to have acquired large tracts of land. Governor
Tunai’s economic and political fortunes were thus linked to those of the
settlers.
The NLC mandate as originally envisioned allowed it to intervene in
Narok’s bitter group ranch disputes to negotiate compromises, revoke ill-
gotten titles, return grabbed land, and re-demarcate boundaries. Many
group ranch oﬃcials perceived such operations and functions as a threat,
surely due to the very large number of complaints made against them for
alleged illegalities.47 Members of the II Purko clan, having extensive land
interests in the county, were party to disputes in the most conﬂict-prone
areas. Meanwhile, citizen complaints against inﬂuential Siria clan mem-
bers were rife on Siria group ranches in the Transmara highlands.
The NLC, in cooperation with some MCAs from constituencies
aﬀected by group ranch disputes, took up some of cases in 2015 and
2016, apparently at least in part in response to local requests for conﬂict
mediation via alternative dispute resolution. Yet in the face of local veto
players, the NLC was not able to institutionalize a local presence in
Narok in the form of a CLMB, and was not able to touch the most
45. Interviews with land-sector actors in Narok, April 2016.
46. For background, see Esther Mwangi, Socioeconomic change and land use in Africa: The
Transformation of property rights in Maasailand (Palgrave Macmillian, New York, 2007);
Marcel Rutten, Selling wealth to buy poverty: The process of individualization of land ownership
among the Maasai pastoralists of Kajiado, Kenya: 1890–1990 (Saarbrücken: Verlag Breitenbach
Publishers, 1992); Peter Veit, ‘Rise and fall of group ranches in Kenya’ (World Resources
Institute Focus on Land in Africa Policy Brief, World Resources Institute, Washington, DC,
2011).
47. Key informant interview, Clerk CLMB, 6 April 2016.
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sensitive land issues. It sought compromises where possible in group
ranch conﬂicts and avoided the most explosive land issues – those of
settlement, indigenous and minority rights, and land-grabbing in the Mau
Forest – even though such matters were arguably well within its formal
mandate.48
Bomet is another case of county legislature as veto player. The Bomet
Governor’s strategy was evident in the ﬁrst proposed slate of six nominees
for the CLMB that he (rather than the NLC) submitted for approval.
It included two names from the Governor’s home constituency,
Chepalungu, but none from the home constituency of his leading rival for
the governorship, Konoin constituency. The Bomet County Assembly
twice rejected names as biased in favour of the Governor’s cronies, produ-
cing a stalemate around the CLMB that was never resolved.49 The
CLMB Secretary worked in an oﬃce with a couple of staﬀers, but was
then withdrawn completely from Bomet (and transferred to Vihiga in
November 2015) due to the NLC’s belief that the secretary could not
manage land aﬀairs without a CLMB.50 Bomet’s land politics thus played
out in the absence of the NLC, even though the leading land issues in this
county fell squarely within the NLC mandate.
The political struggle in Bomet was linked to national politics. The
Bomet Governor, Isaac Ruto, challenged Deputy President William Ruto
directly by resisting incorporation into the new Jubilee party and creating
a new opposition-aligned political party of his own, the Mashinani
Development Party of Kenya (or Chama cha Mashinani [Party of the
Grassroots]). The DP appeared to be ﬁghting back by mobilizing net-
works of local politicians, both in the county itself and among national-
level politicians from Bomet, who would back Isaac Ruto’s rivals in a
2017 bid for the Bomet Governor’s seat. Between 2014 and 2015, the
leading rival was Konoin MP, Sammy Koech. Land issues and the control
of the CLMB in Bomet were swept up in this two-level game for party
control within the county and at the national-level.
Meanwhile, the Bomet governor was locked in struggle with an import-
ant faction of the County Assembly, which criticised his alleged eﬀorts to
monopolize power and run the county ‘like family property’.51 The
Governor’s County Executive Committee for Lands was singled out for
48. See Francesca Di Matteo, ‘“Community Land” in Kenya: Policy making, social mobil-
ization, and struggle over legal entitlement’ (Working Paper No. 17-185, Department of
International Development, London School of Economics and Political Science, 2017).
49. Another attempt to nominate members in early 2015 also failed. Interview, Lands
Oﬃcer, Nairobi, 26 June 2017.
50. A third attempt to constitute the CLMB was underway in 2016 when the CLMBs were
disbanded.
51. Bomet county interviews, March 2016.
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particular ire by some inﬂuential Bomet County Assembly members.52
The bad blood between the Governor and the Assembly was manifest in
the several unsuccessful attempts by the latter to impeach the former. The
perception of many MCAs that the governor sought to use the CLMB as
a tool of the County Executive at least partially explains their attempt to
veto the operation of the CLMB.
In Siaya, old-guard local elites in the county legislature played defense.
The ability of both national and local level actors to use the dispensations
of the 2012 land laws and the NLC to promote transparency and rule-of-
law in the Siaya land sector was checked by the old county elite of the
pre-devolution era. In 2013, the county government declared its intention
to register and title all land in the county within ﬁve years. It appointed a
CLMB without public or political controversy in 2014, and in cooperation
with the NLC, undertook an inventory and audit of all public and com-
munity land. Interviewees in county government stressed that they were
‘intent on reviewing land allocations by the previous local authorities, to
unearth and reverse some irregular transactions and possibly charge the
responsible individuals’.53 This would include a review of past urban and
rural land allocations by the pre-devolution local authorities and inquiries
into disputes over land used by the public, including disputes involving
the privatization of land that had been donated to the government for
local development projects in the 1980s.54
Many of those caught in the cross hairs of the county government and
CLMB’s plan to review irregular land allocation were former councillors
of the defunct Siaya County and Bondo County Councils. These oﬃcials
were linked to the still-operating Land Control Boards, which controlled
Trust Lands and the municipal land under the pre-2010 municipal and
provincial governments. In Siaya as in other Kenyan counties (including
Kiambu, Machakos, Narok, and Meru), several key oﬃcials under the for-
mer system now occupied strategic positions in the new, devolved county
structures.55 At the centre of the allegations of past land grabbing in Siaya
was the so-called Gang of Four, a group of well-connected individuals
with large land holdings, allegedly including the land upon which the
county government oﬃces stand. They found political representation
within the new county government through the former mayor of Siaya
Town. He was elected to the new County Assembly in 2013 and became
52. Ibid.
53. Interviews, Siaya, April 2016. The County Government website states the govern-
ment’s intention audit all public land.
54. Interview, Siaya County government, 8 April 2016.
55. Lang’at, ‘How counties lost Sh 143bn property: Idle land and vehicles were shared out
before the 2013 General Election’, The Nation, 5 September 2016.
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the head of the County Assembly’s Lands Committee, all the while main-
taining strong links to the LCB in his own sub-district.
According to local interviewees, land issues were the source of a split
among members of the County Assembly of Siaya. The ‘new broom’ fac-
tion made-up of those without ties to the former council unsuccessfully
opposed the bid of the standard-bearer of the old guard faction for control
over the County Assembly’s Lands Committee. New brooms claimed that
some members of the former council and some County Assembly mem-
bers were living on grabbed public plots.56 In 2015 and 2016, the old
county council elite was well positioned to veto moves by the County
Assembly and the CLMB to undertake the land inventory and audit
necessary to advance transparency and rule of law in the land sector.
Ruling party and the Ministry of Lands as veto players in Meru and Nakuru
The Meru county government regarded the NLC as a ‘friendly institu-
tion’.57 Meru established a CLMB in 2013 without disputes or challenges
to NLC nominations. The county’s own land administration bureaucracy
was highly capable, technically and professionally. County oﬃcials began
digitizing records inherited from the Meru Municipal Council and
employed new technical staﬀ.
Meru also provided the CLMB and the NLC with what the county gov-
ernment perceived as a full list of ill-gotten public lands in the county,
including Meru Town, where the county government claimed that 200
prime plots belonging to the county had been grabbed by political heavy-
weights.58 Meru County oﬃcials argued that the ill-gotten public land
was needed for new investors, county development projects, and new
county buildings. The County Executive Committee Member for Lands
called upon the NLC, and in March 2016, the NLC announced that it
would ‘repossess [over 200 plots of] public land that have been grabbed
by private developers in Meru County, regardless of the social status of
the grabbers’.59 But in Meru, it seems that having the support of county
oﬃcials was not enough to ensure that the NLC could do its job.
High-proﬁle Meru governor Peter Munya, in ﬁrm control of the Meru
County Assembly, ran afoul of the Jubilee Alliance in 2015 by opposing
56. Interviews, nominated MCA and others, Siaya, February 2016.
57. Interviews, Meru, April 2016.
58. Interviews, Meru county oﬃcials, April 2016. See David Muchui, ‘Land Shortage hits
towns as individuals grab 200 plots [in Meru Town alone]’, Daily Nation, 24 February 2015,
<http://www.nation.co.ke/counties/Land-shortage-hits-town-as-individuals-grab-200-plots/-/
1107872/2634448/-/153kkia/-/index.html> (2 January 2016).
59. Government of Kenya, Ministry of Lands, Urban Development and Housing,
‘Grabbed land to be repossessed, NLC says’, 14 March 2016 <http://www.mygov.go.ke/?p =
7477> (3 April 2018).
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the dissolution of Jubilee’s aﬃliate parties, including his own Alliance
Party of Kenya (APK), to form the new Jubliee Alliance Party.60 Apparently
in retaliation, President Uhuru Kenyatta and the DP William Ruto publicly
backed Meru Senator Kiraitu Murungi in his bid to unseat Munya in the
2017 elections. This stand-oﬀ came to deﬁne centre-local land politics in
Meru, positioning powerful national actors at loggerheads with both the
Meru County Government and the NLC in this county.
The County Assembly opposed the Ministry of Lands’ selective issu-
ance of about 135,000 title deeds in Meru County as part of the Jubilee
government’s agenda to deliver 3 million titles countrywide before the
2017 election. In March 2016, the Ministry distributed land titles to
smallholders in Imenti South, the home constituency of Munya’s rival,
Senator Murungi.61 The Meru county government attempted to block
this action, citing collusion between the Members of Parliament and the
Ministry of Lands.62 It was able to secure postponement of release of the
title deeds twice, protesting the Ministry’s actions as undermining devolu-
tion and violating the government’s legal and constitutional obligation to
work with the NLC. The titles were issued, however. In Meru, party polit-
ics and the Ministry kept the NLC in check-mate.
In Nakuru, the national executive and ruling party acted as veto players.
Nakuru is central to national politics, and land issues are central in
Nakuru. In this tightly controlled environment, a CLMB was ﬁnally
appointed in May 2015, but it was largely sidelined. The CLMB in
Nakuru, like other CLMBs, was underequipped and understaﬀed and
was not visible in land matters. One notable exception occurred in June
2016 when the Nakuru CLMB secretary himself was suspended and
alleged to have been involved in corrupt land deals.
Some Nakuru MCAs appealed to the NLC in 2014 for support to
address long-standing, festering issues around land holdings in former
land-buying company areas in Kuresoi (Chepakundi, in Olenguruone
Division), where titleholders who were evicted in 1992 election-related
‘ethnic clashes’ wanted to be properly bought-out by new occupants.63
60. The APK is a regional party for Mt. Kenya East. In 2015 Munya was elected the
second head of Kenya’s Council of Governors and is regarded as a possible contender for
the Presidency.
61. MLHUD, ’Lands CS to issue title deeds in Meru and Tharaka-Nithi’, 7 March 2016
<http://www.mygov.go.ke/lands-cs-to-issue-title-deeds-in-meru-and-tharaka-nithi/> (3 April
2018).
62. If Meru’s population of 1.5 million includes about 375,000 households, then this titling
wave should reach almost 1 in every 4 households.
63. Nakuru County Hansard, 4 December 2014, pp. 3–4. On land in the 1992 ‘ethnic
clashes’, see Jacqueline M. Klopp, ‘“Ethnic clashes” and winning elections: The case of
Kenya’s electoral despotism’, Canadian Journal of African Studies 35, 2 (2001), pp. 473–517;
Gabrielle Lynch, I say to you: Ethnic politics and the Kalenjin in Kenya (University of Chicago
Press, Chicago, IL, 2011); and Boone, ‘Politically-Allocated Land Rights’.
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Yet as was the case for other highly sensitive Nakuru land cases involving
violent land displacement and restitution after electoral violence, the
NLC and the CLMB remained were on the sidelines as national-level pol-
itical actors took the lead. A Parliamentary Commission was appointed in
September 2015 to look into the Kuresoi disputes, for example.
This is not the outcome expected in 2012, when important powers over
the management of public land, settlement and resettlement, and IDP
issues (and land titling) were to be shared between the Ministry of Lands
and the NLC, or transferred to the NLC. Yet in line with the national
government’s desire to maintain control over a potential hotbed of vio-
lence, national-level actors linked to the executive and ruling party took
the initiative in managing land issues in Nakuru, blocking the NLC in
most domains. NLC chairman Swazuri was, however, brought in to lead
‘alternative dispute resolution’ eﬀorts involving Maasai claims to lands
wanted by politically well-connected project developers around Naivasha
and along the Nakuru–Narok border.
The long history of government allocations and re-allocations of land
meant that the NLC mandate to review all public land allocations threa-
tened many established interests at both the county and the national level.
Interviewees in county oﬃces in Nakuru believed that most public land in
Nakuru town (estimated population of 393,000 by 2017) had been
grabbed by former county councillors, many of whom occupied strategic
posts in the new county government.
Conclusion
The legislative eﬀort to enact the reformist land-related provisions in the
2010 Kenyan constitution was focused on vesting land-administration
authority in an independent regulatory agency, the NLC, and on lever-
aging democratic decentralization by giving county level actors the power
to approve (veto) NLC-appointed members of the CLMBs. Yet as
Dubash and Morgan and others have argued, strategies that hinge on the
operations of non-partisan regulatory agencies often underestimate the
importance of institutional and political context in shaping the actual out-
comes. Inevitably, they argue, the drafting and implementation of reform-
ist legislation will be shaped by previous patterns of state-building, the
power of existing elites, and the interplay of interests around both the pro-
cedures and substance of reform. This has been the case in Kenya. An
analysis focused on the overriding inﬂuence of informal institutions, cor-
ruption, neopatrimonialism, and/or low state capacity does not do justice
to all the mechanisms at work in this case.
Power to implement land administration powers deﬁned under the
2012 land laws lay in the hands of diverse institutional actors in both
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administration and representative institutions at both the national and
county levels. Some of the individuals expected to implement the new
land laws and cooperate with the non-partisan NLC were precisely those
targeted by reform, and they often used veto powers to ﬁght back. Others
sought to expand county land prerogatives at the expense of the centre, as
seen in both Kiambu and Meru, or to assert a regional political agenda at
the expense of partisan players in the national ruling coalition (Bomet).
Some sought to use local veto powers to block local elite capture of the
CLMBs. These actors were able to use the prerogatives and powers of
institutions within which the NLC and the CLMBs were nested, or of
interlocking institutions at the national or country level, to neutralize,
stall, or veto the functioning of the NLC and/or the creation of the
CLMBs.
David Kennedy has underscored the limits of rule of law to achieve
overtly political redistributive choices. Manuel Tedoro and Anne Pitcher
have made the same argument about regulatory agency reform.64
Redistribution is indeed a large part of what has been at stake in land law
and land administration reform in Kenya. Constitutional provisions and
new laws were to transfer power from the executive and to place it in what
were envisioned to be politically neutral, more technocratic institutions,
the NLC and the CLMBs, whose local credibility was to be sanctioned by
elected county governments. The new land institutions were to have been
empowered to recover ill-gotten public lands and stolen community lands
and, in the broadest reading of the original mandate, redistribute land to
those with legitimate claims and/or those wronged in the past. The high
stakes of land law reform Kenya and its redistributive potential seem to
make the cautionary admonitions of Kennedy and of Tedoro and Pitcher
especially appropriate in this case. As Albertus showed in his study of
redistributive land reforms in Latin American countries, redistributive
land reforms Latin American countries, veto players can use formal state
institutions including representative institutions under democratic
regimes to deﬂect reform drives.65 Institutional players may use their veto
to block attempts to hijack reform, or to block their rivals’ ability to gain
advantage from reform.
The case of Kenya’s 2012 land law process and the struggle over the
NLC mandate underscores the persistent and perhaps growing need to
take account of systemic political forces such as partisan rivalry, clashing
preferences over state structure, and bottom-up pressures for
64. David Kennedy, ‘The “Rule of Law,” political choices, and development’, in David M.
Trubeck and Alvaro Santos (eds), The new law and economic development (Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge and New York, 2006), p. 106; Teodoro and Pitcher,
‘Contingent Technocracy’.
65. Albertus, Autocracy and redistribution.
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redistribution in the analysis of constitutional, policy, and legislative
change in African countries. While clientelism, informal political relation-
ships, and particularistic elite interests surely play a strong role in explain-
ing outcomes, an institutional veto player analysis such as the one
developed in this study directs attention to ways in which these systemic
political forces ﬁnd expression in politics that are played out through for-
mal state institutions, including representative institutions. In Kenya and
many other African countries, the salience and complexity of such formal
institutions has increased over time with multi-partyism, decentralization
and devolution, and more open political arenas.
Veto player analysis does not propose a general theory of actors’ relative
power or motives, however. Here the analysis of the 2012 land law reform
process in Kenya seems to underscore above all the loss of initiative by
the grassroots forces rallied around the 2010 Constitution’s promise of
land administration policies that would recover stolen public lands and
right past abuses of executive power. Kenyan reformers and their inter-
national allies threw their post-2009 eﬀorts into a legal reform process,
rather than investing equivalent eﬀort and resources in building grassroots
political momentum or political-party agendas around the 2012 legislative
eﬀort, or around support for elected county-level representatives who
would tackle the substantive issues that animated land politics in particu-
lar counties. Although urban-based professional civil society organizations
consulted widely with citizens at the grassroots in the run-up to the draft-
ing of the National Land Policy, after 2009 there was no institutionalized
mobilization from below around substantive land demands. We can
speculate that the fall-oﬀ of popular mobilization at the legislative stage,
coupled with the lack of an institutionalized movement such as a broad-
based political party committed to the land law reform agenda, may have
helped to empower the institutional veto players at the national and the
country level who have worked to stall or thwart the constitutional pro-
mises of land law reform.
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